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1196 PEOPLE V. GROVES [71 C.2d I 
[Crim. No. 13371. In Bank. Oct. 3, 1969.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FREDDY 
GROVES, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Arrest-Under Warrant-Complaint.-On appeal from a con-
viction of second degree burglary, defendant could not success-
fully challenge the validity of the warrant on which he was 
arrested, although it was based on a complaint made on in-
formation and belief and none of the underlying facts were 
set forth in the c.omplaint or .otherwise presented to the magis-
trate, where defendant made no challenge to the validity of 
the warrant at any time during trial. 
[2] Searches and Seizures-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest 
-Search of Premises.-In a burglary prosecution, the evidence 
supported the trial court's implied finding that defendant's 
arrest was not used as a pretext to search his apartment for 
evidence, where, though police officers e.ould have arrested 
defendant when he drove into his garage at the apartment 
building, the arresting officer testified that the arrest was de-
layed, not because he wished to arrest defendant inside his 
apartment, hut because he hoped defendant would lead them 
to his accomplice. 
[3] Id. - Without Warrant - Incident to Arrest. - The Chimel 
rule relating to the permissible extent of a search incident to an 
arrest does not apply to searches conducted prior to the effective 
date of that case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Carl H. Allen, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of second 
degree burglary affirmed. 
Frederick C. Michaud, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, and Bruce P. Griswold for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci 
and Joyce F. Nedde, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment en-
tered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of the second de-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Arrest, § 20; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 14. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Arrest, § 2,; [2] Searches and Sei-
zures, § 29; [3] Searches and Seizures, § 24. 
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gree burglary of a telephone booth (Pen. Code, § 459). He 
contends that his arrest and the search incident thereto were 
unlawful and that the trial court therefore erred in admitting 
into evidence certain items seized during the search. ' 
Late in the afternoon of December 9, 1966, Mrs. Koonce and 
Mrs. Peters, employees at the University of California Hos-
pital in San Francisco, heard an alarm indicating that some-
one was tampering with a coin'receptacle in a telephone booth 
opposite their office. They saw a' man sitting inside the oooth 
and another man standing outside it with an overcoat over his 
arm. Mrs. Koonce asked the men if they had taken money 
from the telephone, and one of them said "No." As the me~ 
turned and walked quickly away, Mrs. Koonce heard a sound 
like jingling money coming from the overcoat. After the men 
.left the building, she saw them running down the street. The 
'Coin receptacle was missing from tb;e booth. 
On separate occasions a San Francisco investigator for the 
telephone company showed three photographs ~ Mrs. Koonce 
and Mrs. Peters. Neither was present when the investigator 
showed the photographs to the other. A special agent of the 
telephone company in Los Angeles had furnished the photo-
graphs to the San Francisco investigator. Both Mrs. Koonce 
and Mrs. Peters identified the photograph of defendant as 
that of the. man they sawin the telephone. booth. That same 
day, they again identified defendant from a photograph at the 
San Francisco Police Department's headquarters. A police 
lieutenant who witnessed this identification signed a com-
plaint 'Charging defendant on information and belief with 
. burglary of the telephone booth. A warrant for defendant 's 
arrest was issued on the complaint. No evidence was presented 
to the issuing magistrate other than the signed complaint, and 
it did not set forth any of the underlying facts upon which 
the complaining officer's belief was based. 
The, San Francisco Police Department teletyped the Los 
Angeles Police Department that the arrest warrant had 
issued. The teletype gave defendant's name and his physical 
description; it also described an accomplice and stated that 
the San Francisco police wanted defendant and an accomplice 
for the crime of telephone burglary and that ·the Los Angeles 
police should be on the lookout for lock-picks. A Los Angeles 
police officer who had defendant under surveillance and knew 
his Los Angeles address arrested defendant at an apartment 
where he was living in I ... os Angeles soon after the teletype 
came to the officer's attention. A 20-minute search of'the 
apartment incident to the arrest uncovered coin wrappers; a 
1198 PEOPLE V. GROV'E'3 [71 C.2d 
key to the uppBr housing of a pay telephone, a $100 bill, an air-
line baggage tag, and a San Francisco garage ticket. All of 
these items were admitted into evidence ,at defendant's 
trial. 
{l] Defendant 'Contends that the warrant for his ,arrest 
was constitutionally invalid under People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 
Ca1.2d 418 [67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321], which was de-
cided 31ter his trial. He urges that the arrest and search 
incident thereto were therefore unlawful and that the trial 
court erred in admitting into evidence the items found during 
the search. Although defendant objected to the admission of 
this evidence on the ground that the search was unlawful f<?r 
other reasons, at no time during the trial did he challenge the 
validity of the arrest warrant. Accordingly, he may not chal-
lenge the validity of that warrant for the first time on appeal 
unless our decision in the Sesslin case "represented such a 
substantial change in the former rule as to excuse an objection 
anticipating that decision." (People v. DeSantiago (1969) 
ante, pp. 18, 22 [76 Cal.Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353], and cases 
there cited.) The Sesslin decision did not represent such a 
change. 
In that case we held that "an arrest warrant issued solely 
upon the complainant's 'information and belief' cannot stand 
if the complaint or an ac'companying affidavit does not allege 
underlying facts upon which the magistrate can indepen-
dently find ,probable cause to arrest the accused." (People v. 
Sesslin, supra, 68 Ca1.2d 418, 421.) That holding, however, 
was compelled by the Fourth ~nd Fourteenth Amendments of --
the United States Constitution as interpreted by five decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court (Giordenello v, United 
States (1958) 357 U.S. 480 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 78 S.Ct. 1245] ; 
Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23 [10 L.Ed.2d,726, 83 
S.Ct. 1623] ; Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [12 L.Ed.2d' 
723,84 8.Ct. 1509] ; Barnes v. Texas (1965) 380 U:S. 253 [13 
L.Ed.2d 818, 85 S.Ct. 942] ; Jaben v. United States (1965) 
381 U.S. 214 [14 L.Ed.2d 345,85 S.Ct. 1365]). The last two of 
these cases were decided in 1965, over a year before defend-
ant's arrest and trial. Accordingly,' the Sesslin decision did 
not change the law. It was merely the first case in whi'Ch this 
court was called upon to apply the foregoing decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court.! 
We note, however, that trial-counsel's failure to object to 
!Sinee the Sesslin decision did not change the law, there is no merit 
in the Attorney General '8 contention that it should not apply to arrests 
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the validity of the arrest warrant does not suggest any in-
competency on his part. Although the issue of probable cause 
to make an arrest without a warrant was not litigated in the 
trial court, evidence in the record indicates that had the pro-
secution been called upon to do so, it might easily have justi-
fiedan arrest without a warrant. (See People v.Chimel 
(1968) 68 Ca1.2d 436, 441-442 [67 Cal.Rptr. 421, 439 P.2d 
333]" revd. on other grounds, Ghimel v. California (1969) 
395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034].) Aceord~ngly, 
trial ~unsel mIght reasonably have concluded that anychal-
lenge to the validity of the arrest would have been futile. 
[2] Defendant contends that even if the arrest was law-
ful, the search incident thereto was unreasonable on the 
ground that the arrest was used as a pretext to search for 
evidence. (See United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 U.S. 
452, 467 [76 L.Ed. 877, 883, 52 S.Ct. 420, '82 A.L.R. 775] ; 
People v. Ha'ven (1963) 59 Cal.2d 713 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 
P .2d 927].) He. relies on the fact that the officers could have 
arrested him when he drove into the garage at. his apartment 
building ~ut waited until he reached his apartment. The ar .. 
resting officer testifi.ed, h~we-ver, that the arrest was delayed, 
not because he wished' to arrest defendant inside his apart-
ment, but because he hoped that defendant would lead them 
W his accomplice. The evidence supports the trial court's im-
plied finding that the arrest was not used as a pretext to 
search for evidence. 
[3] Defendant also contends that the search was more ex~ 
tensive than iSpBrmissible as incident to an arrest under 
Chimel v. California, supra, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The Chimel case, 
however, does not apply to searches conducted before that case 
was decided. (People v. Edwards (19~69) ante, p. -- [8.0 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P .2d 713].) 
The judgmentis~affirmed . 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk,. J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
Ap'pellant 'spetition for a rehearing was denied October 29, 
1969. 
made before the Sesslin case was decided. Moreover, the arrest in this 
case occurred after the foregoing decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, and it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether any of those 
decisions should be given prospective effect only. We note also that 
People v. Gardner (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 19, 23 [71 C'al.Rptr. 568], is 
not in point. The arres,t in that case was without a warrant, and the 
reference therein to Sesslin was only to Sesslin '8 application of the ~oc· 
trine of the fruit of the poisonous tree. 
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